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One Case for an Independent Federal Judiciary: Prison
Reform Litigation Spurs Structural Change in California
James D. Maynard*
"It should be emphasized that when confronted with an obstinate, obdurate
and unregeneratedefendant, a more detailed remedy is needed... [Wihen
a defendant exhibits a stubborn andperverse resistance to change, extensive
court-orderedreliefis both necessary andproper."'
I. INTRODUCTION

Consider a prison where prisoners are bound with "fetal" restraints, chained
to toilets,3 and locked naked in outdoor cages.4 Imagine a prison in which
inmates' bones are broken,5 their skulls lacerated,6 and their skin peeled off after
being bathed in boiling water. In such a place, inmates are routinely extracted
from their cells with tasers, batons, mace, and shotguns that fire rubber blocks.8 A
"code of silence" reigns9 and authorities regularly turn a blind eye to the
ritualized infliction of pain by prison guards.'0 In this place, guidelines about the
use of firearms and lethal force are routinely violated" and guards may shoot to
if confronted with violence because no warning shots are
kill or injure
2
permitted.

*

J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2006; B.A., History with High Honors,

University of California, Berkeley, 2002.
1. William Wayne Justice, Judge, E.D. Tex., The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, Address Before the
George Washington University National Law Center (Mar. 10, 1992), in 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992)
(explaining Judge Justice was one of the Texas District Court judges involved in lengthy and ongoing litigation
over unconstitutional state prison conditions in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
2. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[Fetal restraints involve] handcuffing
an inmate's hands at the front of his body, placing him in leg irons, and then drawing a chain between the
handcuffs and legs until only a few inches separate the bound wrists and ankles.").
3. ld. at 1169.
4. Id.atll7l.
5. Id. at1165 (describing a guard applying enormous force tobreak a prisoner's arm inorder toinflict
pain rather than assert control); id. at 1163 (observing that a correctional officer repeatedly punched an inmate
until blood started shooting out of the inmate's mouth and the inmate suffered a fractured jaw).
6. Id. at 1162 (describing the first of many factual scenarios in a section entitled "Staff Assaults on
Inmates").
7. Id.at1166-67.
8. Id. at 1172-78 (citing a member of the Pelican Bay staff: Cell extractions are often viewed as
"opportunities to punish, and inflict pain upon, the inmate population for what were often minor rules
violations").
9. Id. at 1164.
10. Id. at 1177 (quoting Charles Fenton, former warden of the federal super-maximum prison Marion
Penitentiary and witness for the plaintiffs). This was the only case in which Warden Fenton testified on behalf
of an inmate class. Id. at 1157 n.4, 1158 n.6.
11. ld.at1179.
12. Id. at 1184 (citing the deposition transcript of Pelican Bay Prison Associate Warden Garcia).
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The prison is neither Abu Ghraib nor Guantanamo Bay; it is Pelican Bay
State Prison located in Northwest California.' 3 In 1990, just one year after the
prison opened, a class of prisoners confined in Pelican Bay's Secure Housing
Unit (SHU) brought suit in Madrid v. Gomez. 4 In Madrid, the prisoners
challenged the constitutionality of the conditions of their confinement. 5 At the
conclusion of the trial, after more than fifty-seven witnesses had testified and
more than six thousand exhibits were entered into evidence,' 6 Judge Thelton
Henderson appointed a Special Master to monitor prison conditions at Pelican
Bay and work with the plaintiffs and defendants to develop a remedial plan to
address numerous constitutional violations. 7 Judge Helton held that the court
would retain jurisdiction over conditions of confinement at Pelican Bay Prison
until "all Constitutional violations found [through the litigation] have been fully
and effectively remedied.' ' 8 As of May 2005, more than eleven years after the
trial began, the court maintains jurisdiction.' 9
Judge Henderson uncovered horrific abuse 2° in Pelican Bay's SHU during an
active fact-finding process. Before the trial commenced, Judge Henderson spent
two days touring Pelican Bay. 2' He also maintained an active role in the Madrid
case by supervising and approving the implementation of a remedy. Eventually,
he threatened a federal court takeover of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to correct systemic problems, including
undue influence and abuse of power by the California Correctional Peace
Officers Association (CCPOA).22
Critics of the type of judicial intervention undertaken by Judge Henderson
decry such federal court action as activism and outside the realm of legitimate
judicial decision-making.23 Such criticism in the context of prison reform led to

13. Id. at 1155.
14. Id.
15. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2000) (allowing federal suits based on a deprivation of
constitutional rights).
16. Madrid,889 F. Supp. at 1156.
17. Id. at 1282-83.
18. Id. at 1283.
19. Madrid v. Woodford, No. C90-3094-TEH (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2004) (order regarding (1) Special
Master's Report Re "Post Powers" Investigations and Employee Discipline and (2) CCPOA's Motion to
Intervene).
20. See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text; see also infra note 223 and accompanying text.
21. Madrid,889 F. Supp. at 1146, 1156.
22. See discussion infra Part .A.
23. Both liberals and conservatives have criticized federal courts for being activist. See Michael C. Dorf,
After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247-1248 (2004) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTrrUTIONAL ORDER (2003)); see also William Rehnquist, Decisions Shouldn't Lead to Judges Impeachments,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 24, 2005, at B5 (defending judicial independence, articulating the view that the framers
of the Constitution wanted to protect judicial independence, and arguing that judicial decision making should
not be swayed by popular opinion); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 1-13 (1998)

similar view regarding judicial intervention in state prison systems).

(articulating a
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the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA or "Act"), which
limits the power of federal courts to intervene in state prison systems. 2 The
PLRA was promulgated as a solution to the perceived twin problems of runaway
prisoner litigation and abuse of federal court power;25 the PLRA's proponents
sought to leave reform of state prisons to state political processes.26 Congress,
however, passed the PLRA based on mistaken assumptions about the nature of
prisoner litigation,27 thereby improvidently eliminating enforcement mechanisms
designed to ensure the constitutionality of state prisons.28
By limiting federal court power to hear prisoner's cases, the immediate result
was an upsurge in constitutional violations of individual prisoner's rights. 21
Indeed, prisoner abuse claims have risen since the passage of the PLRA because
the political power of prison authorities and guards has grown and their control
of state prison systems has been consolidated. ° Furthermore, prisoners are
increasingly shut out of the political process, especially in states that disenfranchise and otherwise hinder the social participation of convicted felons.3 This
lack of political power suggests that majoritarian political processes remain an
ineffective mechanism to enforce prisoner rights. 2 Federal judicial intervention is

an effective and legitimate method of prison reform; the critique of federal judges
as activist and the assumptions underlying the PLRA are misguided when
illustrated by the facts and results of the Pelican Bay litigation.33
The 1960s and 1970s saw federal judicial intervention in state prisons peak
when federal courts across the Southern states reformed state prison institutions,
and moved en masse from an "hands-off' policy to an interventionist policy
based on the Eighth Amendment. 34 With its numerous constitutional deficiencies,
Pelican Bay State Prison was a archetypal case for federal court intervention.35
The PLRA,36 however, limits federal court power to intervene in state prisons
through structural reform and, when passing the Act, Congress wrongly assumed

24. See discussion infra Part H.B.
25. Id.
26. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559 (2003) (indicating that the
PLRA was driven in part by conservative dissatisfaction with "imperial" or activist judging).
27. Id. at 1692 (finding that although inmate suits outnumbered non-inmate suits per capita in federal
courts, once state case filings were included, the filing rates for both groups were very similar).
28. See infra pp. 427-28.
29.

ALAN

ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 22-27,32 (2004).

30. Id. at 20-22.
31. See id. at 206-07 (noting that ex-felons face other barriers, such as diminished employment prospects
and exclusion from public assistance benefits, government housing, and federal student loan programs).
32. Id. at 32-33.
33. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 50.
34. Id. at 30-5 1.
35. Cf id. at 166-67 (noting that court action can be successful).
36. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-134, § 802(a) 110 Stat. 1321, 66-77 (codified at
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1932 (1996)).
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that the need for such structural intervention had ended.37 Nevertheless, as
demonstrated by Madrid"s and the hundreds of California prison and prisoner
cases of the last decade, 9 judicial intervention remains the only viable tool to
remedy constitutional deficiencies in state prisons because majoritarian political
processes failed to produce serious reform.4 ° Moreover, comparing the type of
federal court intervention with the ensuing state prison reform provides evidence
of a nexus between intervention and reform: the broader and more intrusive the
threat of judicial action, the more quickly state officials have actually
implemented reform.4'
For example, since Madrid was decided in 1995, the California prison system
has received increased judicial scrutiny as a result of lawsuits brought by the
Prison Law Office on behalf of California prisoners. 4 Before Judge Henderson
threatened to place the entire California prison system under the supervision of
the federal court in 2004, 4 state-elected officials were unwilling to act." Only
since then have the Legislature and the governor seriously proposed or enacted
nascent prison reforms. 4 Although there are other reasons that help explain the
recent shift towards prison reform, including legislative term limits and the 2003
recall election,46 federal judicial intervention has been a necessary catalyst for
41
institutional change in California's prisons.
This Comment will examine Madrid, the last major prison case before the
passage of the PLRA in which a federal court broadly intervened in a prison
system through fundamental structural reform litigation. Part 1 outlines the

37. See infra p. 433; see also infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
38. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
39. Id. at 1169; see also discussion infra Part III.A.
40. See discussion infra Part III.A.
41. See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 73 (quoting an Arkansas state official as saying that the
state would do "whatever it takes to get out from under" federal court supervision).
42. The Prison Law Office is a public interest law firm located in San Quentin, California. It has
successfully challenged the constitutionality of prison conditions in a number of contexts, including general
prison conditions, excessive force, medical care, mental health care, and parole revocation proceedings. A
description of the office and a list of its cases are available at www.prisonlaw.com.
43. See, e.g., Jenifer Warren, Takeover of State Prisons Is Threatened; A FederalJudge Assails the
Schwarzenegger Administration on Lack of Reform, Its Deal with Guards, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at Al
(detailing Judge Henderson's criticism of California's prison system).
44. Inaction by state officials in California is partly attributable to the influence of the CCPOA. See, e.g.,
Mark Martin, Guards Union Corrupts Prisons Report Finds, S.F. CHRON., June 5, 2004, at Al (discussing the
influence of the CCPOA in California political culture); Franklin Zimring, California Commentary; A Gulag
Mentality in the Prisons;A Burgeoning Population and Powerful Guard Union Allowed PrisonsLike Corcoran
to Slip Out of Control, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1998, at B9 (explaining the slow progress in prison reform in recent.
years); see also discussion infra Part IlI.A.
45. See discussion infra Part I.D.
46. id.
47. Id.
48. Madridmay be the last serious, ongoing vindication of prisoners' constitutional rights in light of the
passage of federal legislation designed to curb prisoner complaints and limit federal court power. See discussion
infra Part I.B.
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historical and jurisprudential foundations that serve to legitimize federal judicial
intervention. Part III examines the California prison system through the lens of
the Madrid litigation 9 and the ongoing social and political problems caused by
the prison crisis. Part IV concludes that it is important to preserve the power and
independence of the federal judiciary because judicial intervention remains the
only viable tool to remedy constitutional deficiencies in state prisons so long as
majoritarian political processes fail to produce serious reform and to protect the
rights of the most politically powerless societal sector."'
II. CORRECTIONAL REFORM
In a significant speech to the American Bar Association in 2003, Supreme
Court Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy implored members of the Bar to
pay more attention to the problems of this nation's prison systems." He noted
that one goal of the nation's current correctional systems is to "degrade and
demean the prisoner" and he declared this goal unacceptable in "a society
founded on respect for the inalienable rights of the people" because individual
constitutional rights do not end with incarceration. He further called on civil
litigation lawyers who "have expertise in coordinating groups, finding evidence,
and influencing government policies," to take up the cause of prison reform
because such lawyers "have great potential to help find more just solutions and
more humane policies" for incarcerated individuals. 3
Certainly, many public policy litigation lawyers have struggled to do as
Justice Kennedy proposed: to ensure the individual constitutional rights of
prisoners through various reform efforts, including litigation. 4 Prison litigation
has forced federal courts to move from a "hands-off' approach toward a more
interventionist posture regarding prisoner rights cases. However, assessing the
impact that litigation has had on prison systems is difficult because of the
complex forces operating to influence correctional systems.56 At the least, the

49. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
50. Given the fluid and ongoing California correctional crisis, this Comment limits itself to the situation
as it stood in early 2005.
5 1. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the
American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/
kencomm/amkspeech 03.html [hereinafter Kennedy Speech] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Susan Sturm, The Legacy and Future of CorrectionsLitigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 641 (1993)
(observing that hundreds of cases have been "brought and won by lawyers on behalf of inmates challenging the
conditions and practices of our nation's" correctional institutions).
55. Id. at 659. But see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 39-46 (noting that there were hundreds of
civil rights prison cases brought prior to 1965, before the federal courts began to take them seriously, and
explaining that significant reform litigation did not emerge until the federal courts shifted from civil rights
jurisprudence to an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
56. Sturm, supra note 54, at 648.
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shift towards judicial intervention has resulted in measurable positive changes in
state correctional institutions, including the understanding and internalization of
constitutional -standards by correctional officials,57 the development of
bureaucratic policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with these
standards,58 and finally, the increased political and public awareness of conditions
within correctional institutions.5 9
A. The History and Evolution of PrisonReform
Prior to the eighteenth century, punishment operated on the body of the
condemned through public torture designed to be "a gloomy festival of
punishment" 6° that objectified the accused, demonstrated the state's power to
punish, and deterred crime.61 In the late eighteenth century, the modem prison
emerged, 62 bringing with it chronic calls for penal reform. 6 From the workhouses
of England in the early eighteenth century, to the Philadelphia model of the
nineteenth century, to Bentham's infamous Panopticon, 64 expressions of penal
power have historically been accompanied by internal and external proposals for
reform to better discipline and rehabilitate prisoners and humanize the entire
prison institution.65
These changes in penal theory, from public punishment to institutional
rehabilitation, mirror the evolution of the twentieth century welfare state. 6 The
last quarter century has seen a swing away from the promise of the "Great
Society:" political rhetoric has shifted from the aspirations of a social welfare
state that would provide for all, to a discourse of personal responsibility and ever
increasing punishment.67 Increased state power, premised on crime control and
punishment, merges with the penal elements of political emphasis on personal

57. Id. at 662.
58. Id.at 667.
59. Id. at 669-70.
60. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 8 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995).
61. Id. at48-49.
62. See id. at 16 (observing that there was a "reduction in penal severity" in the period from 1775-1975
because prisons began to focus less on punishment of the condemned's body and more on rehabilitation).
63. Id. at 115 (describing the rapid growth of imprisonment as taking up almost the entire field of
punishment). Foucault also traces the history of both internal and external efforts to reform the prison institution
over time. Id. at 121-26.
64. See id. at 205 (identifying the Panopticon as a manifestation of state power that has become a "figure
of political technology" and assures surveillance of the subject whether in or out of prison).
65. Id. at 94-98 (identifying six major rules that underlie the power to punish and should be adhered to
in order to obtain maximum results both for the individual and society).
66. Cf. Theodore Caplow & Jonathon Simon, UnderstandingPrison Policy and Population Trends, 26
CRIME & JUST. 63, 70-71 (1999) (indicating that over the course of the New Deal and Great Society eras
rehabilitative imprisonment was "rationalized as a form of state benefit").
67. Id.
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responsibility rather than underlying social conditions." This shift in rhetoricboth a symptom and consequence of increased crime rates, the "Just Say No"
campaign, and an ongoing drug war that resulted in a concurrent prison-building
boom 6 9-has resulted in broad acceptance of the notion that politicians must
favor harsher punishments and lobby for tougher crime-control measures to gain
and maintain political power.70
As political discourse and sentiment switched to the crime-control model, so
did penal philosophy itself; penal theory shifted from a model focused on
rehabilitation and post-incarceration societal re-integration towards a neo-classic
punishment regime designed to punish the prisoner 7' through extra-legal
actual torture,
dehumanizing methods, which include the use of excessive force,
12
as
Furthermore,
prisoners.
female
with
especially
power,
of
guard
and abuse
prisons became increasingly hidden from public view, the possibility of these
extra-legal means of punishment increase and state action further dehumanizes
"part of the family of humankind. 74 This dehumanization continues when
prisoners are "re-integrated" into a society in which they are barred from
anything approaching full social participation.
While society moved from a penal regime focused on rehabilitation to one
focused on punishment and control, the federal courts responded by shifting
towards a more interventionist, active posture.76 First, federal judges enforced

68. See id. at 70-71 (identifying three factors that underlie changes in the United States prison
population: political culture, public policy, and institutional organizations). The authors argue that this shift has
set in motion a "reflexivity of the penal system" in which the power of prison industries and corrections
employees grows as the prison population increases due to more prosecutions and the tendency of parole and
probation officers to return people to prison. Id. at 72-73. Foucault also identified the danger of an increase in
disciplinary mechanisms and argued that such mechanisms have a tendency to "swarm" and emerge from the
"closed fortresses [prisons] in which they once functioned and ... to circulate in a 'free' state" in which
discipline evolves into ever more flexible methods of state control. FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 211.
69. ELSNER, supra note 29, at 18-27.
70. Caplow & Simon, supranote 66, at 70 (1999).
71. Cf.FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 113 (noting the link between prisons and broader society and
articulating the notion of the punitive city).
72. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (concluding that the Eighth
Amendment's restraint on using excessive force has been repeatedly violated at Pelican Bay); see supra notes 212 and accompanying text; see also infra note 223 and accompanying text.
73. Pelican Bay is near the town of Crescent City located almost four hundred miles north of San
Francisco. Id. at 1155.
74. Kennedy Speech, supranote 5 1.
75. See ELSNER, supra note 29, at 206-07 (noting ex-felons face other barriers such as diminished
employment prospects and exclusion from public assistance benefits, government housing, and federal student
loan programs).
76. Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (placing the entire state prison system into
receivership after eight years of willful intransigence by an uncooperative defendant); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.
Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (extending the holding to all conditions within the prisons and finding that the
conditions of confinement violated "any judicial definition of cruel and unusual punishment"); Newman v.
Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (holding the denial of medical care to be a willful and intentional
violation of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). See generally, FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23. See
also supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
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constitutional norms in Southern prisons by creating legal doctrines designed to
produce more "moral" prisons." Then, they opened to public scrutiny, previously
closed state prison institutions where members of the media, government, and
volunteers witnessed the fact that notions of rehabilitation had been discarded in
favor of a revival of archaic forms of physical torture and control.7" Federal
judges used special masters, experts, and other administrative means to make
quasi-administrative decisions that reformed prisons.79 In Judicial Policy Making
and the Modern State,s° professors Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin argued
that the prison cases of the 1960s and 1970s were vital to eliminating the last
vestiges of Southern slavery by "imposing national standards on state
institutions."'" To achieve the reform of those prisons, federal district court
judges used bureaucracy as a coordinating idea with which to reshape Southern
prisons.82 This coordinating idea enabled courts to promulgate standards and
policies to professionalize corrections regimes and enforce individual constitutional rights. 3
Federal courts sought to impose a modern bureaucratic scheme of
governance in archaic Southern prisons. Regardless of methodology, courts
sought to bring Southern prisons from the dark ages and into the modern age
where evolving standards of civil society began to transform Southern prisons
into establishments that adhered to national constitutional standards. 5 The
Southern prison cases fit nicely into that project since, arguably, the practices and
conditions in Southern prisons were the final vestiges of feudal slave systems of
the nineteenth century8 6 The imposition of constitutional norms on state
government actors fits into any theory of federal judicial action, since judges are
the final enforcers of the constitutional rights of all individuals, regardless of
social status8 7

77. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23.
78. Id. at 265 (arguing that the "moral prison" was one of the central "coordinating ideas" that explains
why federal judges suddenly found prison cases to be justiciable within the Eighth Amendment).
79. Id. at 305-11.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 149.
82. Id. at 271 (noting that bureaucratization of prison administration was a second such "coordinating
idea").
83. Id. at 281.
84. Id. at 271.
85. Id. at 166-67.
86. Id. at 151-57.
87. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 146-47 (Andrew Hacker ed. 1964) (arguing
that the federal judiciary must protect the Constitution and the rights of individuals and minorities).
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B. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Since federal court intervention in state prisons successfully altered prison
life for hundreds of thousands of prisoners," Congress then passed the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (CRIPA), which authorized the
United States Attorney General to bring actions against state institutions,
including prisons, in an effort to secure the constitutional rights of prisoners. s9
Although section 1983 actions ensured access to federal courts and achieved
substantial reform of some state prisons,? CRIPA provided an additional avenue
through which the Federal Department of Justice (DOJ) could intercede to
enforce the constitutional rights of prisoners. 9' However, the DOJ rarely brought
suit under the provisions of CRIPA, leaving section 1983 actions as the main
vehicle for inmates to enforce rights or to allege excessive force by prison staff.92
Although federal judicial intervention remedied conditions of confinement in
prisons across the United States, Congress then limited judicial discretion in
hearing such claims by enacting the PLRA in 1995. 93 The PLRA was enacted to
address a perceived problem that frivolous prisoner complaints were overloading
federal court dockets. 94 Support for the law also had the additional political
benefit of appearing tough on crime. 95 Political emphasis on the rhetoric of crime
control and punishment again drove the enactment of the PLRA.96 In the decade
prior to the enactment of the PLRA, inmate filings in federal court increased
during eight of the ten years to a maximum of forty thousand cases filed in
1995."7 A comparison of inmate filing rates and the overall filing rates of the
general population showed that inmates were no more litigious than the general
population. 98 In introducing the Act, Senator Orrin Hatch, then chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, stated that the legislation would "bring relief to a civil

88. See supra notes 56-59, 75-80 and accompanying text.
89. Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 1, 94 Stat. 349 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997-1997i (1980)).
90. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2004).
91. Id. § 1997a.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut, 931 F. Supp. 974 (D. Conn. 1996) (initiating suits against
state institutions for mentally retarded persons); United States v. L.A., 635 F. Supp. 588 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(initiating suit over conditions in juvenile hall); United States v. Hawaii, 564 F. Supp. 189 (D. Haw. 1983)
(initiating suit over prison conditions). However, CRIPA has most often been invoked to protect patients in
mental health units and developmentally disabled living centers. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d
635 (1988) (initiating suits over conditions at a state mental health facility).
93. Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-134, § 802(a) 10 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1932, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (1996)).
94. Ann H. Mathews, Note, The Inapplicabilityof the Prison Litigation Reform Act to PrisonerClaims
of Excessive Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 536, 538 (2002).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 539 (indicating that the PLRA was driven in part by conservative dissatisfaction with
"imperial" or activist judging).
97. Schlanger, supra note 26, at 1558 (noting that inmate litigation took up nineteen percent of the
federal civil docket and that fifteen percent of federal civil trials were civil rights cases brought by inmates).
98. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits" and help "slam shut
the revolving door on the prison gate and to put the key safely out of the reach of
overzealous federal courts.""
Specifically, the PLRA limited prisoner access to federal courts by amending
' Previously, a district court had discretion
a provision of CRIPA. m
to continue a
case to require the prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before the case
could go forward in federal court. '°' In contrast, the PLRA mandates that a
prisoner exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing litigation in
federal court.' °2 Requiring prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies means
that the majority of prisoner suits will never reach federal district courts because
most prisoners proceed pro se'l 3 and prisoners are often exposed to retaliation by
prison authorities, chilling the possibility of future prison reform through section
1983 actions. °'
Many commentators have criticized the PLRA as an unnecessary intrusion into
the discretion and inherent powers of federal court judges.' 5 In addition to removing
judicial discretion concerning the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Act
limits the remedies available in prisoner civil rights lawsuits.' 6 The Act also restricts
prospective injunctive relief through a tripartite need, narrowness, and intrusiveness
requirement:' 7 the relief must be "narrowly drawn" to extend "no further than
necessary to correct the violation" and must be the "least intrusive means necessary
to correct the violation of the federal right."'0 8
The Act requires federal judges to limit preliminary injunctive relief to no
more than ninety days,' °9 limits the types of prophylactic remedies that may be
imposed," and sets time limits on the relief' by requiring that a court may
extend prospective relief only by issuing written findings that prospective relief
is necessary and that such relief is the least intrusive relief possible to correct the
federal right in question."2 In practice, the needs, narrowness, and intrusiveness,

99. Id. at 1565-66 (2003) (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch in 141 Cong. Rec. S14, 418 (daily ed. Sept. 27,
1995)).
100. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West 2000).
101. Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7, 94 Stat. 349 § 7 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.§ 1997e (1980)).
102. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e.
103. David M. Adlerstein, Note, In Need of Correction: The "Iron Triangle "of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1690 (2001) ("[A] full ninety-six percent of prisoner Section 1983 suits
are brought pro se [and] eighty-two percent of prisoners are high school dropouts.").
104. Mathews, supranote 92, at 555.
105. William B. Mack I, Justicefor Some: Excessive Force Claims After Porter v. Nussle, 36 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265 (2003); Mathews, supra note 92; Adlerstein, supra note 100.
106. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a) (West 2000).
107. Id. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 3626(a)(2).
110.

Id.

111.
112.

Id. § 3626(b).
Id. § 3626(b)(3).
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criteria for prophylactic injunctive relief, coupled with termination provisions,
mean that federal intervention in state prisons is largely a relic of the past." 3 The
Pelican Bay Prison case (Madrid) may be the last instance where a federal
district court has exercised equitable discretion to compel prisons to4 honor the
compulsory constitutional rights of prisoners over an extended period."
Most critiques of federal court intervention in state prisons focus on the
alleged misuse of federal court power rather than the misuse of power by prison
guards and administrators, causing commentators to misapprehend the problems
of power."5 Judge Henderson's ongoing and successful supervision of Pelican
Bay undercuts the rhetoric that drove passage of the PLRA and the ongoing wails
of those politicos who criticize federal judges as activist." 6 Federal courts in
prison cases challenge state government power that violates constitutional norms,
only to the extent necessary to end constitutional violations." 17
The CCPOA's power within state government and a resistance to change within
the CDCR are recurring themes in the legal texts of the Pelican Bay case and are
powerful political forces to be reckoned with in any attempt to reform the California
correctional system.""' Judge Henderson is using the limited power of the district
court to publicize conditions of confinement in California prisons, to expose
entrenched political power structures resistant to change, to professionalize the
CDCR, and ultimately, to transform California's prison system from a system where
prison guard power destroys constitutional rights into one where guards honor those
rights.' 9
C. Legitimacy of JudicialIntervention
Attacks on so-called activist judges have increased as concerns about federal
judicial power have regained currency in lockstep with the resurgence of
federalist ideology and executive branch power. 20 Critics from both the left and
113.

See discussion supra Part I.B.
114. Id.
115. John Choon Yoo, Recognizing the Limits of Judicial Remedies: Who Measures the Chancellor's
Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996) (criticizing
federal court involvement in structural reform litigation).
116. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
117. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 12961311 (1976).
118.
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995), enforced sub nom. Madrid v. Woodford,
No. C90-3094-TEH (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2004).
119. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
120. See Charlie LeDuff & Nick Madigan, The California Recall: The Candidates; New Twist Brings
Anger from Right, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at Al (reporting former California GOP Chairman Shawn
Steel's critique of the Ninth Circuit panel's reliance on Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), to delay the 2003
gubernatorial recall election); see also Yoo, supra note 112, at 1123 (criticizing federal court involvement in
structural reform litigation). But see Chayes, supra note 114, at 1296-1311 (defending the role of a judge as an
active fact finder and arguing that public law litigation is particularly well suited to the nature of the federal
judiciary).
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the right have characterized judicial activism as anti-democratic and antimajoritarian, arguing that judges must interpret rather than make the law.12 ' Past
decisions that compelled broad institutional or social reforms, such as Brown v.
2
were particularly criticized at the time they were
Board of Education,1
2
rendered. 1 Still, judicial intervention in state prison systems during the remedial
stage of litigation often spurred state elected officials to act, suggesting that at
institutional reform, such criticisms of judicial
least in the context of complex
24
flawed.'
are
intervention
Judges, particularly Article III judges, are in a unique position to encourage
broad institutional reform. Despite criticism that wide-ranging judicial
intervention is anti-democratic or counter-majoritarian,' the framers envisioned
judicial advancement of unpopular positions as the final protection of minority
groups' constitutional rights.2 6 Since federal judges do not face the electorate and
therefore are insulated from political pressures, they can compel needed reforms
by acting in ways that are politically unpopular.'2 2 Although it may be preferable
for local political processes to take care of structural reforms, such changes often
little incentive to act on behalf of
languish, because elected officials have
28
politically unpopular minority groups.1
In the context of prison reform, Professors Feeley and Rubin have attacked
the social myths that delineate the proper role of the judge; most notably, they
question the notion that judges should interpret the law according to existing
rules without considering the social results of those decisions. 9 They further
argued that regardless of whether structural prison reform cases are viewed as
policy-making or constitutional rights enforcement, such decisions are firmly
121. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
122. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
123. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991).
124. See discussion infra Part HI.D.
125. Alexander M. Bickel first described the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" in THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
126. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[The Court]
must not, in the guise of 'judicial restraint,' abdicate our fundamental responsibility to enforce the Bill of
Rights."); see also Stephen B. Bright, PoliticalAttacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judges From Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 326 (1997)
(quoting Justice Hugo Black who described the constitutional role of the federal judiciary in Chambers v.
Florida,309 U.S. 227(1940)).
127. See Bright, supra note 126, at 327-29 ("[The Bill of Rights] is regularly denigrated in political
discourse in the United States today as nothing more than a collection of technicalities. Someone needs to step
forward and remind everyone that the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights are fundamental
principles ... ").
128. For example, one commentator argues that the reason civil rights cases are mainly enforced by
federal courts, rather than state courts, is that elected state court judges are not independent enough to protect
the rights of unpopular minorities. See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence be Attained in the South?
Overcoming History, Elections, and the MisperceptionsAbout the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
817, 853-60 (1998).
129. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 13-17.
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within the powers of the federal judiciary.'3 ° In analyzing judicial action, Feeley
and Rubin defined policy-making as "officials exercis[ing] power on the basis of
their judgment that their actions will produce socially desirable results,"'' which
means that all judicial decision-making is intertwined with policy-making.'
Such interpretive and ongoing judicial decision-making and intervention in state
prisons is a slow process that, over time, results in constitutional conditions of
confinement and the professionalization of state correctional departments.'33
In the Pelican Bay litigation, Judge Henderson's role fell within an established
doctrinal framework of prison reform litigation and Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Judge Henderson used hermeneutic interpretation and mediation to
work towards the creation of a more moral prison system by professionalizing the
Pelican Bay Prison administration and paying more than lip service to the Constitution.
As the litigation proceeded, he realized that the problems uncovered in the
implementation stage extended throughout the CDCR and merited a restructuring of
the entire Department through the use of federal court power.'35 Many commentators
have defended mandatory injunctive relief, such as the relief Judge Henderson ordered,
as a legitimate adjudicatory function by federal court judges. 1 6 Even with the positive
results of prison reform litigation, the problem in such litigation
is that the courts still
37
struggle to enforce and implement court ordered remedies.
Bureaucratic institutions are notoriously difficult to change,'38 and prisons are
no exception.'39 Enforcing remedies remains a problem, even when society
acknowledges prison failures.'4 0 Given the difficulty of institutional change, there
is no other effective check on "correctional institutions other than litigation or the
threat of litigation."'' 4' Thus, since state political processes will not protect the
constitutional rights of prisoners, federal judges must enforce constitutional

130. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977); Tracy
A. Thomas, The ProphylacticRemedy: Normative Principlesand Definitional Parametersof Broad Injunctive
Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 301, 303-06 (2004); Chayes, supra note 117, at 1282-84.
131. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that Ronald Dworkin criticized such action by judges
in LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)).
132. Id. at 9.
133. Id. at 169-70.
134. See discussion infra Part IH.B. 1.
135. See infra Part I1.D; Madrid v. Woodford, No. C90-3094-TEH (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2004).
136. See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23; Thomas, supra note 130, at 303-06; Chayes, supra note
117, at 1282-84 (defending judicial action that is administrative, active, ongoing, and uses non-adversarial
methods, such as the use of special masters and outside experts, to accomplish fact-finding).
137. Sturm, supra note 54, at 673.
138.

FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 300-01.

139.

Madrid, 889 F. Supp. 1146. See generally CORRECTIONS INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL,

REFORMING

CALIFORNIA'S

YOUTH

AND

ADULT

CORRECTIONAL

SYSTEM

(June

2004), available at

http://www.reportcpr.ca.gov/corr/index.htm [hereinafter Deukmejian Report] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
140. Sturm, supra note 54, at 691.
141. Id.
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norms. 14'2 The "institutional change model," targeting "particular institutions or
systems with illegal practices," offers the greatest promise in achieving prison
reforms to ensure compliance with constitutional standards. 1'3 Therefore,
plaintiffs counsel or federal courts'" must oversee prisons because political
officials are unable
to endorse or engage in substantive prison reform due to high
45
political costs.
Although federal courts must enforce the constitutional rights of prisoners,
"no one familiar with litigation in this area could suggest that the courts have
been overeager to usurp the task of running prisons.' 46 Rather, federal courts
have stepped in only when state officials and agencies have failed to enforce the
constitutional rights of prisoners and when constitutional violations were so
egregious as to constitute the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or
where "the soul-chilling inhumanity of conditions in American prisons [was]
thrust upon the judicial conscience" and become impossible to ignore. 4 7 Faced
with these continuing violations, the Supreme Court has held that district courts
have broad remedial authority to address constitutional violations and can modify
earlier orders and direct more intrusive relief if such violations remain
uncorrected after an initial order.4 4 However, the PLRA limited this power even
though prison litigation transformed state prisons in the United States by
mandating constitutional norms. 14 9 The chilling abuses outlined in Madrid,
symptomatic of wider problems within the CDCR, are strong evidence of why
passage of the PLRA was a policy mistake." 0

142. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain rights from the political arena and from majority
control).
143. Susan P. Sturm, Lawyers at the Prison Gates: OrganizationalStructure and CorrectionsAdvocacy,
27 U. Micti. J.L. REFORM. 1, 10 (1993).
144. This is exactly the type of litigation Professor Abram Chayes describes in his seminal article as
constitutional policies that "embod[y] affirmative values." See Chayes, supra note 117, at 1284, 1295. Chayes
explains that judges play an increasingly prominent role in fact evaluation during the remedial phase of
institutional change litigation, because the judges oversee the implementation of a judgment or consent decree.
Id. at 1297-1300. This type of judicial action has been both vigorously criticized and defended over the years;
the arguments center on whether federal courts violate separation of powers and federalism principles when
they undertake supervision of state administrative agencies. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Theodore Simon,
DestabilizationRights: How Public Law LitigationSucceeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1017-19 (2004). But see
generally FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 1-13 (taking an opposite view).
145. Caplow & Simon, supra note 66, at 70-71; see discussion infra Part l.A.
146. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 354-55 (Brennan, J., concurring) (listing inhumane conditions confronted by federal inmates,
including vermin in living quarters and food, overcrowding, sexual assault by other inmates, brutality by prison
guards, and rampant violence and citing these conditions from Judge Frank Johnson's extensive factual findings
in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd as modified, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in
part on other groundssub nom., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)).
148. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977).
149. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 50 ("[The] nation's prisons, jails, and juvenile facilities have
been Constitutionalized.").
150. See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text; see also infra note 223 and accompanying text.
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III.

THE CALIFORNIA CRISIS

52
Scandal, 5 ' broken promises of systemic reform by prison officials,
increased tensions between prison guards and prisons and an increased prison
population'53 characterized California's prison system between 1990 and 2005."'
During the same period, California politicians, while paying lip service to the
notion of reform by creating committees and commissions to investigate the
problems, made no effective effort to implement systemic change.'55 State elected
officials abdicated their responsibility to oversee and control the CDCR to the
CCPOA. 5 6 The only effective efforts at reform-at Pelican Bay State Prison and
Corcoran State Prison-were the result of intervention by the federal courts.'57

A. California'sPrisonSystem and the CCPOA
Vested political interests, including those of the CCPOA, have captured
California's political processes, thus federal court intervention remains the only
effective mechanism to enforce the constitutional rights of California's prisoners. 58 During testimony to the American Bar Association's Justice Kennedy
151. See, e.g., Mark Arax & Mark Gladstone, Officials Stymied Corcoran Probe, Investigators Testify,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1998, at Al (describing testimony before the California Legislature that claimed that then
CDCR Director James Gomez blocked investigations into the staging of fights and subsequent inmate murders
by Corcoran prison guards); see also Dan Morain, California's Profusion of Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1994, at AI (detailing the explosion in prison growth and union power and noting that the CDCR has no control
and that the CCPOA was able to deploy an officer to help plan for new prison growth).
152. Mark Arax & Jenifer Warren, Despite State Promises, Reform Eludes Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
28, 2003, at B 1 (describing the resignation of then CDCR Director Edward Alameida, known as "Easy Ed," for
his acquiescence to the wishes of the CCPOA leadership, and noting that the CDCR "remains troubled by
allegations that rogue guards still go unpunished, union bosses continue to exert strong influence, and top
administrators still thwart whistle-blowers").
153. LrrrLE HOOVER COMM'N, BACK TO THE COMMUNITY: SAFE AND SOUND PAROLE POLICIES,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii (Nov. 2003), availableat http://www.lhc.ca.govlhcdir/172/reportl72.pdf [hereinafter
LHC Executive Summary] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that in 1980, California incarcerated
approximately 25,000 inmates, but in 2000, it had incarcerated more than 160,000 inmates).
154. Dan Morain, Era of Higher Tensions Seen at State Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al
(describing how the interplay of a growing prison population is growing due to the passage of the three-strikes
law, longer prison terms, and the loss of inmate privileges and programs).
155. Arax & Warren, supra note 152 (noting that repeated scandals in the department stemmed from the
same cause: a general lack of oversight by the legislative and executive branches, coupled with untrammeled
CCPOA influence and power within the CDCR and political branches).
156. Cf Mark Gladstone & Mark Arax, Attorney General's Office to Investigate 24 Shootings by
Corcoran Prison Guards, L.A. TiMES, Jan. 24, 1999, at A3 (describing how the shifting blame between the
CDCR and the CCPOA ultimately led to a lack of any accountability).
157. See discussion infra Part HI.B.2 (describing the district court's intervention at Pelican Bay);
Morain, supra note 154 (noting the United States Department of Justice investigation of Corcoran prison guards
accused of staging prisoner cockfights and then using lethal force in response to subsequent fights). The
investigation ultimately led to the federal indictment and trial of eight Corcoran prison guards. Mark Arax, Jury
Sought for 8 Corcoran Prison Guards, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at Al. Corcoran went from being the
deadliest prison in the United States in 1994 to seeing no fatalities between 1994 and 2000. Id.
158. See discussion infra Part lII.D.
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Commission,'9 Michael Alpert, chair of California's "Little Hoover"
Commission, 6 advocated a return to a rational rehabilitation system in
California's state prisons, noting that the practical goal of incarceration should be
preventing recidivism.' However, such proposals are antithetical to the CCPOA
as substantial reforms could lead to fewer prisoners, fewer new prisons and
prison guards, and a concurrent weakening in the political power of the union.' 6
State Senator Gloria Romero, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on the
California Correctional System and author of a number of bills introduced to
reform the CDCR during the 2003-2004 legislative term, expressed concern
about the CCPOA's undue influence. 6 3 Intense lobbying by the CCPOA killed
most of Senator Romero's bills, leading the Senator to declare that "justice took a
walk" when the Legislature ruled against Senate Bill 1731, which would have
overturned a clause in the CCPOA's contract that currently requires all
information, including the accuser's name, to be turned over to the guard under
investigation prior to the commencement of the inquiry.' 64 CCPOA power is such
that the CCPOA need only remind a legislator of the political cost of appearing
soft on crime and threaten to withhold political campaign contributions in the
next election cycle to obtain cooperation.'65
The CCPOA has the most at stake in any attempted reform of California's
prison system. '66 Consequently, the union has been the most resistant to any67
reform perceived as weakening the CCPOA's control of the prison system.

159. American Bar Association, Press Release, ABA Forms New Commission to Review Mandatory
Minimum Sentences, Prison Conditions and Pardons (Oct. 6, 2003), availableat http://www.abanet.org/media/
oct03/100603_1.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
160. The bi-partisan Little Hoover Commission is a statutory body designed to "investigate state
government operations and-through reports, recommendations and legislative proposals-promote efficiency,
economy and improved service." Little Hoover Comm'n, About the Commission, http://www.lhc.ca.
gov/lhcdir/about.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
161. Testimony of Michael Alpert, Chair, Little Hoover Comm'n, before the Am. Bar Ass'n's Justice
Kennedy Comm'n at McGeorge School of Law (Apr. 15, 2004) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
162. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
163. Senator Romero introduced several bills during the 2003-2004 legislative session that were
designed to reform the CDCR, including bills designed to give the media access to prisoners (SB 1164), create
an independent Inspector General to oversee the Youth and Adult Corrections Agency (SB 1352), and reform
internal affairs procedures within the CDCR (SB 1400). See generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY,
2004 BILL SUMMARY: MEASURES SIGNED AND VETOED, http://www.sen.ca.gov/htbin/testbin/seninfo-dated?
sen.committee.standing.publicsafety.bills (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
164. Jenifer Warren, Some Reforms Blocked, but Prison System Is Improving, Senator Says, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 2004, at B6.
165. Id. (noting that the union warned lawmakers that a "yes" vote was fraught with peril).
166. Susan Beck, Inside Story, RECORDER (S.F., Cal.), May 14, 2001, at 1 (stating that the CCPOA has
more than 28,000 members who pay more than $1.5 million dollars in dues per month).
167. See Harriet Chang, State to Revamp Parole System: Lawsuit Settlement Seeks to Reduce Inmate
Population, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 2003, at A-1 (noting CCPOA opposition to any reform in the parole
revocation process and indicating that the current prison population stands at 162,000 inmates and that each
year about 100,000 parolees are returned to prison through the parole revocation process); see also State Net
Ballot Book, November 2000 Ballot Initiatives-Once More With Feeling?, CAL. J., Sept. 1, 2000 (noting
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Inmate complaints about guard misconduct had to be disclosed to the guard in
question prior to the initiation of any investigation, and correctional officers have
had little to fear from internal investigations.1 6' This requirement has likely had a
chilling effect on prisoner complaints, as retribution by some guards is almost
certain after a prisoner files a complaint.' 69 The recent creation of an independent
Bureau of Review to investigate allegations of guard misconduct and excessive
force threatens to make inroads on CCPOA power.'7 ° Observers hope the Bureau
will be able to undertake independent investigations of correctional officer
wrongdoing that is free of the improper influence that has marked past
investigations. 7 ' Until recently, the political influence of the CCPOA has blocked
this type of reform.'72
The politically connected union exercises the kind of "raw power and
privilege" possible only in a society where criminal punishment is the prevailing
political motif.173 The coercive power of the CCPOA in the halls of prisons and
the state Capitol is troubling in a state that once pioneered a "national model for
prison-based rehabilitation" under then Governor Earl Warren. 74 In a critique of
the current system, the Little Hoover Commission concluded that real change
depended upon whether "California's leaders have the will to make the policy
7
choices based on evidence rather than ideology, on facts rather than fears.'

Over the last two decades, California's political leaders made policy choices
based on ideology and political expedience rather than the rule of law leaving
federal courts to remedy constitutional deficiencies and to push for real reform in
California's prisons.1

CCPOA opposition to Proposition 36 that proscribed treatment rather than incarceration for first time drug
offenders).
168. Jenifer Warren, Major Prison Reform Eludes Lawmakers; A Few Measures Pass, but Significant
Changes Opposed by Guards Union are Voted Down, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at B 1.
169. Id.
170. Jenifer Warren, Prisons Promise a New Code for Guards, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2004, at Al.
171. Id.
172. Mark Arax, Union Crushed Bid to Let State Prosecute Guards, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1999, at Al
("Sorry, but I'm whoring for the CCPOA." (quoting Cal. Assembly Member Jim Battin (R-La Quinta))).
Assembly Member Battin made that statement to California Attorney General Bill Lockyer after the CCPOA
successfully killed a bill that would have given the California Attorney General's Office jurisdiction to
investigate prison guard and administration illegalities. Id.
173. Warren, supra note 164 (quoting Senator Romero).
174. Editorial, State Prisons' Revolving Door: A Siege Against Success Series, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2003, at M4.
175. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, BACK TO THE COMMUNITY: SAFE AND SOUND PAROLE POLICIES 84
(November 2003), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/172/reportl72.pdf [hereinafter LHC PAROLE
REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
176. See discussion infra Part HI.D.
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B.

FederalJudicialReform

Pelican Bay State Prison's SHU, the subject of Madrid v. Gomez,17 was
designed to better control the most dangerous prisoners within the California
correctional system." CDCR designed the SHU to house "the worst of the
worst" and, since prison authorities accept the syllogism that guards are only as
violent as the inmates warrant, this has led to a host of constitutional violations at
Pelican Bay. 171
Because of his unique role as an Article III judge, Judge Thelton Henderson
could begin the job of prison reform at Pelican Bay by undertaking an impartial
evaluation of prisoner claims. In doing so, Judge Helton publicized their plight
while maintaining the legitimacy of judicial intervention and upholding a core
principle of the Eighth Amendment. ° Thus, Judge Henderson acted within a
well-established doctrinal framework of federal judicial intervention in state
prison systems to vindicate the constitutional rights of incarcerated prisoners at
Pelican Bay."1 The relevant legal standard for Judge Henderson's decision was
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme
Court has held that the prohibition against such punishment applies to conditions
of incarceration-the Constitution "retains its 'full force' behind prison doors."'8 2
Prison administrators and guards must treat inmates as full human beings: "there
is no place for abuse or mistreatment, even in the darkest of jailhouse cells."'83
through incarceration, not by unnecessarily cruel
Society punishes prisoners
8 4
treatment once jailed.
The Pelican Bay case differs from the Southern prison cases in several
important respects. The Southern prison cases were important because prison
reforms were the final step of the process of national re-integration that began
with reconstruction. 85 The judges in the Southern prison cases sought to impose
administrators to
national social values on state prisons by requiring prison
S 186
conform with accepted bureaucratic patterns and practices resulting in more

177. 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
178. Cf. FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 82 (theorizing ever expanding forms of state control).
179. See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text; see also infra note 223 and accompanying text.
180. After 1995, the number of stories about prison cases and conditions in California rose dramatically.
Prior to 1995 there were very few stories, but after the Pelican Bay decision, more than 1,000 stories were listed
in the California daily newspapers between 1995 and 2004. See Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com.
181. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M.D.
Ala. 1976); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 245.
182. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1245 (citing Michenfelder v. Summer, 860 F.2d 328, 335 (9th Cir. 1988)).
183.
d.atll6l.
184. Id. at 1245 ("[P]ersons are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment." (citing Gordon v.
Faber, 800 F. Supp. 797, 800 (N.D. Iowa 1992))).
185. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 245.
186. Id. at 151-57.
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moral prisons." 7 In contrast, the Pelican Bay case sought to restrain a runaway
correctional system where the CCPOA, rather than agency directors and prison
wardens, ran the CDCR.' s
Where Southern prisons had little or no modem bureaucratic institutions to
control guards and inmates, California's CDCR has both too much and too little
bureaucracy." 9 For example, there is too much bureaucracy in the prisoner
classification and assignment process, but far too little bureaucracy in providing
adequate medical care to prisoners. '9° Recently, the state admitted that prison
medical care is a "broken system" and state officials warmed to the idea of a
federal court takeover.' 9' Ideally, political processes should have modernized the
bureaucracy within CDCR to comply with modem administrative practices and
procedures and to prevent a recapture of the management system by the
CCPOA. 92 However, given that the political process had failed to produce such
reform and ensure accountability, the 93
only effective way to reform the CDCR
intervention.
court
federal
through
was
1. The Eighth Amendment
Over the last half-century, the United States Supreme Court has developed
modem normative principles in prisons to establish standards for the previously nonjusticiable "cruel and unusual punishment clause" of the Eighth Amendment."
These principles have constitutionalized the nature of state punishment and prison
conditions and include the right to adequate medical care, 95 the right to freedom from
punitive or retaliatory physical force, 196 and the right to freedom from confinement
where the totality of prison conditions and practices are so bad that they are
"shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people."'97 For two decades
187. Id. at 245.
188. See discussion supra Part [I.A.
189. John 0. Hagar, Lunch and Lecture at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law (Apr.
6, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
190. Id.
191. Claire Cooper, Prison Health Takeover Looms, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 11,2005, at Al.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See generally William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R. 3D 111 (1973) (describing the history, jurisprudence, and standards of the
Eighth Amendment).
195. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("[Dleliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976))); Danne, supra note 194, at §15 [a]-[c].
196. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169-73 (1976) (holding that physical punishment must not "involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or be "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime");
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (1968) ("[Corporal punishment] runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment
[and] offends contemporary concepts of decency and human dignity and precepts of civilization which we
profess to possess."); Danne, supra note 194, at §§ 6-7[a].
197. Courts will consider the totality of the circumstances in a prison to decide whether or not the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has been violated. Their inquiry includes the
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beginning in the mid 1960s, the Court decided a number of prison condition cases
that claimed Eighth Amendment violations. 98 The Court developed flexible tests to
determine whether a condition or practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
allowing or mandating federal court intervention to enforce the Constitution behind
prison walls.'" The United States Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
has changed over the last half century, with an eye toward the evolving standards of
civilized society.0 0 Prisons need not be comfortable places but neither may they
deprive their inhabitants of basic constitutional protections.20 ' Prisoner constitutional
rights include the right to the minimum necessities of life, including "food, clothing,
sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. 2 2
In assessing claims of cruel and unusual punishment, courts must inquire into
both objective and subjective factors.0 3 Generally, a prison official who acts
reasonably cannot face liability under the Eighth Amendment. 2°' The objective
component of the test for cruel and unusual punishment is an inquiry into the
seriousness of the infliction of pain. The harm must be sufficiently serious to
implicate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Constitution.2 0 5 The
subjective component is an inquiry into prison officials' state of mind to establish
that the pain inflicted was "unnecessary and wanton." 206 The court determines the
objective component as a matter of law while the subjective component is a
question of fact satisfied through proof of deliberate indifference, a standard
equivalent to proof of subjective recklessness in criminal cases.2 7 However,
whenever a prisoner alleges excessive force against individual prison guards, the
standard of proof is higher; the prisoner must show more than deliberate
indifference.0 8 The "core judicial inquiry [becomes] whether force was applied in
a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm." °9
interplay between health care, diet and exercise, discipline, protection of inmates from violence, and the
physical conditions of the facility itself. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt
v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
198. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
199. The Court's tests for whether or not a practice or combination of practices violates the Eighth
Amendment include, whether or not a punishment is inherently cruel, abhorrent to contemporary society,
disproportionate in nature, or involves the arbitrary or discriminatory administration of discipline. Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-48 (1981) (noting the flexible nature of the Eighth Amendment standards for
determining whether a particular situation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
200. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1245 (M.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that Eighth Amendment rights are
fundamentally "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency" (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976))).
201. Id. at 1161 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).
202. Id. at 1245.
203. Id. at 1246.
204. Id. at 1246-47.
205. Id. at 1252.
206. Id. at 1246 (citing Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1247.
209. Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).
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Rather than simply ruling on the validity of Pelican Bay's regulations or the
legality of any individual guard's use of excessive force, Judge Thelton Henderson
characterized the issues as whether the defendants had "a policy of permitting and
condoning a pattern of excessive force, and whether that policy is attributable to a
culpable state of mind."21 This characterization allowed the judge to apply the lower
culpability standard of deliberate indifference rather than the more stringent
malicious and sadistic standard. 21 ' Further, this characterization enabled the judge to
find that prison administration officials had not dealt with conspicuous constitutional
shortcomings in the operation of Pelican Bay Prison and that such deficiencies
required extensive judicial supervision, mandating the appointment of a special
master to aid prison authorities during the remedial stage of the litigation and to
modernize the prison bureaucracy.2 2
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on the use of excessive physical force
"ha[d] been repeatedly violated at Pelican Bay... [where the] force applied was
so strikingly disproportionate to the circumstances" that it clearly contravened
constitutional norms.213 Further, the level of force was "open, acknowledged,
tolerated, and sometimes expressly approved" by the prison administration, thus
meeting the standard of "deliberate indifference., 21 4 In the words of one expert, "I
have never observed... the level of officially • sanctioned
unnecessary and
215
excessive force that exist[ed]" at Pelican Bay Prison.
2. Madrid v. Gomez
In Madrid, prisoners alleged a pattern of excessive force and sought to show
that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference and malicious intent.2 6 The
rise of the super-maximum security prison 21 7 over the last quarter-century has
produced tension between the state's desire to control the most dangerous of
prisoners by transferring them to supermax facilities and the problems that come
with concentrating the most egregious offenders in one facility. 28 As the level of

210. Id.at 1251.
211. Judge Henderson did, however, find that prison administrative officials would be liable under either
theory of culpability. Id. at 1245, 1251-52. He noted that the policies allowing for routine use of force at Pelican
Bay occurred "over an extended period of time that allowed for ample reflection, calculation and forethought"
by prison authorities. Id.
212. Id. at 1260.
213. Id.at 1161.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1247-48.
217. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 129 (describing a super-maximum prison as a place where
inmates are single-celled for twenty-two to twenty-three hours each day, allowed out for only one hour of
exercise, and typically fully shackled-both ankles and wrists-and escorted by multiple guards when leaving
their cells).
218. Id. at 132 (noting that Marion Federal Prison was the first "level six" prison in the federal system
since Alcatraz was closed and that it was designed to control particularly dangerous inmates in the federal
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violence between guards and inmates increases, a "supermax" institution is
always close to spiraling out of control." 9 Proponents of supermax facilities
characterize them as efficient, claiming that guards are only as violent as an
inmate population warrants, justifying the use of maximum rather than minimum
force in any given situation, and reinforcing perpetual instability and violence
within prison walls.2 However, in denying excessive force problems, prison
authorities enable the "code of silence" to prevent staff reporting and allow abuse
of inmates to persist.
Judge Henderson addressed the ideal of a moral prison that comported with
constitutional values using several techniques. First, Judge Henderson characterized
the prisoner's claim as a case about "fellow human beings-most of whom will one
day return to society... [who have] 'human dignity."'' 22' In restoring humanity to
prisoners dehumanized by prison conditions and demonized by political rhetoric,
Judge Henderson recast the problem as one implicating both fundamental human
rights and constitutional violations. 2222 Second, Judge Henderson's acknowledgement
of a common human bond served to bridge the gap between those within and those
without the prison's walls while tacitly destabilizing accepted governmental
structures, calling for renewed vigilance by the public and critically re-examining the
links between prison power and constitutional values. 23 Finally, Judge Henderson
undertook a lengthy recitation of the facts, which covered eighty-nine pages of the
FederalSupplement and detailed numerous and egregious constitutional violations.2
The facts presented are so abysmal that, only a few pages into the opinion, it is clear
that something had gone horribly wrong at Pelican Bay and perhaps throughout the
CDCR. 5
The judicial text exposed a previously hidden system in which secrecy,
autonomy, and total power by guards over prisoners facilitated persecution
through corporal punishment and violent retaliation for perceived slights rather
than legal discipline and rehabilitation. 6 Prisoners have greater value than as
mere objects for the exercise of state power: "[T]he 'mind' [is more than] a
surface of inscription for power" and the body is more than the device through
which that power is inscribed. 227 The language of Judge Henderson's opinion
system).
219. Because of this danger, supermax prisons generally include some type of "control unit" where
prisoners can be perpetually locked down. See id. at 131-33 (describing Marion Federal Prison's "control unit");
see also Madrid,889 F. Supp. at 1227-31 (describing Pelican Bay's "Secure Housing Unit" or SHU).
220. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1178.
221. Id. at 1244.
222. Id.
223. See generally id.
224. Id. at 1155-1244.
225. Id. at 1160-65.
226. Cf FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 129 (positing that texts could expose hidden power structures).
227. Id. at 102 ("[Olne will have to wait a long time before homo criminalisbecomes a definite object in
the field of knowledge.") At Pelican Bay this happened much sooner than Foucault supposed it might. Foucault
argued that the opposing strand of objectification is that of a "criminal ... outside the law, as natural man .... a
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underscored the seriousness of the constitutional violations and the importance of
the recognition that prisoners are part of the polity; prisoners, although
temporarily removed from society by the state, eventually return to society and
should be viewed and treated as part of society." 8
In evaluating conditions within the SHU, Judge Henderson noted that "all
humans are composed of more than flesh and bone-even those who, because of
unlawful and deviant behavior, must be locked away not only from their fellow
citizens, but from other inmates as well. 2 29 The opinion outlined events that
buttressed the legal conclusion that severe constitutional violations had occurred
and were likely to continue to occur at Pelican Bay and throughout the CDCR.23 °
Judge Henderson continually juxtaposed the overarching theme of shared
common humanity and individual constitutional rights with the regimen of pain
and deprivation in the SHU to underscore the seriousness of the issue 231 The
court distinguished the use of force in this case from "normal disciplinary
channels" that defendants were entitled to use in administering the prison.232
Plaintiff's experts testified that punishment at Pelican Bay was "repugnant ....
[and] humiliating," "a ritual of inflicting punishment," "grossly excessive, utterly
unbelievable, and without parallel in present-day American corrections., 233 The
constant reminder of a common human bond deepened and humanized the
factual scenarios, which included tales of beatings and other physical abuse by
guards that rose abhorrent levels: torture motivated solely by the desire for
revenge or retaliation; 23 4 willful deprivations of Constitutionally mandated
medical 233 and mental health care; 23 6 routine and systematic use of maximum

rather than minimum force in everyday situations; 237 a "code of silence" that
pervaded the internal prison culture; 238 and a blind eye to all of these problems by
prison administrators, wardens, and those within the CDCR who were mandated
to undertake internal investigations into such violations.239
According to Judge Henderson, the defendants, after lengthy litigation, had yet
to acknowledge there was a problem within the prison, and had shown no tendency
vanishing trace." Id.
228. Madrid,889 F. Supp. at 1244.
229. ld.at 1261.
230. Id. at 1159-78.
231. See generally id.
232. Id.at 1173.
233. Id. at 1168-76.
234. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
235. Id. at 1200-14 (declaring the medical care system at Pelican Bay to be "grossly inadequate and
unsatisfactory").
236. Id. at 1214-27 ("[T]he record in this case reveals a deliberate, and often shocking, disregard for the
serious mental health needs of inmates at Pelican Bay.").
237. Id. at 1181-92 (characterizing prison administrators' policies and training as "strikingly deficient").
238. Id. at 1164.
239. Id. at 1261 (finding that investigations into prison guard misconduct are "counterfeit
investigation[s] pursued with one outcome in mind: to avoid finding officer misconduct as often as possible").
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to attempt to remedy any of the constitutional violations described at trial.2 ° Based
on these facts and because of a previous pattern of "delay and obstruction ' '24' by
state prison officials, Judge Henderson appointed a special master to oversee
institutional reform and to work with plaintiffs and defendants to devise a remedial
plan.242 By employing a special master, extending the remedial stage of the
litigation, and expanding the scope of federal court intrusion, Judge Henderson
attempted further reform of CDCR management just as federal judges in the 1970s
constitutionalized state prison systems in Arkansas, Alabama, and Texas.2 4'3
C. Internal Results of JudicialIntervention
The special master appointed by Judge Henderson in 1995 issued a final
report in the spring of 2004.2" The special master concluded that, after nine years
of court monitoring and supervision, repeated special inquiries, and federal
prosecutions of prison employees by the Department of Justice, "fundamental
changes in leadership, operations, and attitudes are necessary before the [CDCR]
achieves compliance with the Court's use of force remedial orders."24' The
special master recommended further court oversight and intervention to ensure
that the defendants continued to move towards compliance with the remedial
plan. 246 The special master found undisputed evidence of continued violations of
court orders and noted the intransigence of CDCR officials who "characterize[d]
their misconduct as gross incompetence and negligence rather than deliberate
actions. 247
The problems at Pelican Bay have been largely put to rest, but by far the
most serious concern for both the court and the special master is the "code of
silence" within the CDCR and the entire California Prison System, which is
facilitated by the growth in external and internal political, administrative, and
managerial power of the CCPOA.24 s Increased power of the CCPOA is well
documented 249 as is the inability of CDCR officials to discipline prison guards for
excessive force complaints and other constitutional violations. 0 Finally, the
240. Id. at 1252.
241. Id. at 1281 (noting that in previous prison reform cases from the 1980s and early 1990s, the CDCR
was repeatedly held in contempt for noncompliance with court orders). The Legislative Analyst also noted that
the CDCR lacked any sort of long term plan to address system wide deficiencies. Id.
242. Id. at 1282.
243. Id. at 1245.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 127.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 10.
248. Id. at ll.
249. See, e.g., Editorial, Reform in Name Only: Prison Numbers Tell a Different Story, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Nov. 21, 2004, at E4 (noting that although prison "reform" has been attempted for decades, nothing has
actually been done); see also Deukmejian Report, supra note 139, at 229-32.
250. See Deukmejian Report, supra note 139, at 229 (finding that CDCR officials continue to "silence
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special master concluded that the problems at Pelican Bay "exist at other CDCR
prisons" and "emanate from the CDCR's Central Office in Sacramento, which
serves all prisons. 251 Continued gross contraventions of the Eighth Amendment
at California prison institutions other than Pelican Bay illustrate both the
dichotomy between problems of penal administration and the goals of effective
punishment and the lack of serious reform. 2
D. External Results of JudicialIntervention
Although the CDCR as an institution remains resistant to serious reform,
making progress only in fits and starts, 2 3 federal court intervention has
substantially changed conditions within Pelican Bay Prison2 4 and has brought the
issue of prison reform to the forefront of state politics.

25

Pelican Bay is an

entirely different prison today from the one Judge Henderson toured in 1994 .256
The transformation of Pelican Bay from a prison where gross abuse of prisoners
was routine to one where prison officials honor constitutional rights was only the
first step in altering the way the CDCR operates.257 Judge Henderson's decision
and ongoing oversight substantially transformed Pelican Bay itself into a prison
where staff take pride in their level of professionalism. 2 8 It is no longer necessary
for the federal court to exercise tight oversight and control of day-to-day
operations because of the fundamental changes in prison operations. 2 9 Any
problems that remain are indicative of larger problems that permeate the
CDCR.' 60
In 2004, after the recall election of then Governor Gray Davis, state
politicians began to pay serious attention to the systemic problems within the
CDCR. Governor Schwarzenegger and State Senators Gloria Romero and Jackie
Speier began to work seriously on transforming the way California's prisons are
whistle blowers, block investigations, hide facts, and cover up staff misconduct" and recommending the
creation of an independent Internal Affairs Unit and other systemic reforms).
251. Madrid,889 F. Supp. 1146.
252. FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 90 (theorizing that there must be a principle of moderation for the
power of punishment to be effective).
253. Jenifer Warren, supra note 164 (noting that all three branches of government took on the prison
system and the CDCR with mixed results).
254. Hagar, supra note 189 (stating that very few problems remain at Pelican Bay and it is an entirely
different prison than it was in the early 1990s).
255. See, e.g., George Deukmejian, It Is Time to Overhaul CorrectionsSystem, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept.
19, 2004, at E3 (stating that the prison system is long overdue for reorganization).
256. Hagar, supra note 189.
257. Id. (explaining that the few problems remaining at Pelican Bay are indicative of larger and more
serious systemic problems within the CDCR).
258. Id. (emphasizing that reform benefits both prisoners and staff).
259. Chris Durant, Pelican Bay State Prison: Behind the Walls, EUREKA TIMES-STANDARD (Eureka,
Cal.), Jan. 18, 2004, at Al (reporting that the federal court no longer routinely monitors most areas of prison
operations).
260. Hagar, supra note 189.
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run. 26' The newly elected Governor appointed former guard Rod Hickman as the
Secretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA) and Jeanne
Woodford, former warden of San Quentin and a known advocate for prisoner
rehabilitation, as the new director of the CDCR. 262 Both appear committed to
substantial reform but face serious obstacles, including entrenched bureaucracy,
and a culture of silence and cover-up
the undue influence of the CCPOA
surrounding allegations of prison guard misconduct. 264 The slow pace of reform,
coupled with formidable structural obstacles, led Judge Henderson to threaten a
federal court takeover of the CDCR midway through 2004.265
While ongoing crisis within the CDCR marked 2004, the year also presented
an opportunity for nascent reform. The California Senate held special committee
hearings. 66 Legislators introduced twenty-eight prison reform related bills, and
Governor Schwarzenegger signed seventeen of those bills, including some
opposed by the CCPOA.267 The Governor appointed the Deukmejian Commission
to investigate and recommend systemic reforms. 26' The executive branch also
began to implement reforms, including restructuring YACA and creating an
Independent Bureau of Review 269 to investigate allegations of correctional officer
270
wrongdoing outside of the CCPOA' s sphere of influence and corruption.
Unfortunately, some improvements had already begun to deteriorate in 2005
due to the slow pace of change and the continued opposition of the CCPOA.27'
The plan to reorganize and rename YACA,272 which would create the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is set to be approved by the
California Legislature, but observers question whether centralizing control of the
system will be an adequate solution. 273 The plan makes wardens accountable to

261. Arax & Warren, supra note 152.
262. Editorial, State Prisons' Revolving Door, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2004, at B14; Jenifer Warren,
Prison Guard Turned Boss Pressesfor Reform, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at Al.
263. Andy Furilllo, Probe Sought Over Union Ties, Prison Overhaul; SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 3, 2006,
at A3. Both Rod Hickman and Jeanne Woodford resigned after Governor Schwarzenegger brought in Gray
Davis' chief of staff, Susan Kennedy, to deal with prison reform and the CCPOA. The CCPOA knew they had
to work with Hickman. They now know they can roll over Susan Kennedy with impunity. Id.
264. Pamela J. Podger, Promises to Fix State Prisons Have Been Heard Before, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24,
2004, at Al.
265. See, e.g., Jahna Berry, Jeff Chomey & Jill Duman, Judge Threatens FederalOversightfor State
Prisons,THE RECORDER (S.F., Cal.), July 21, 2004, at 1.
266. Editorial, A Prison System in Disarray,S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2004, at B6.
267. Warren, supranote 168.
268. Mark Martin, Deukmejian to Lead PrisonReview Panel, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 16, 2004, at A 17.
269. Warren, supranote 168.
270. Patt Morrison, Union Knows All About Crime, But Nothing About Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2004, at B3.
271. Jenifer Warren, Victim's Rights Group Blasts Prison Rehab Plan, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at B7.
272. Press Release, Youth & Adult Corr. Agency, Governor Schwarzenegger Sends Government
Reorganization Plan to Little Hoover Commission (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.governor.ca.gov/
state/govsite/gov.htmldisplay (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
273.

Mark Martin, Governor Drops Plan to Combine Youth, Adult Prisons, S.F. CHRON. Mar. 31, 2005,

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37

the executive branch and attempts to insulate prison management from political
pressures, including CCPOA influence.274 State Senator Romero believes that
reorganization of this nature "won't stop the scandals" but he does give "this
'
governor credit for having the internal fortitude to deal with prison reform."275
Further, victim's rights groups, funded by the CCPOA, have stymied other
reforms scheduled to take place, including alternative sanctions for parole
violators.276
Sustained political attention to the problems in California's prison system
requires political courage. Whether California politicians are able to continue the
recent nascent shift toward rehabilitation and humane prison conditions remains
to be seen. Regardless, federal courts will continue to exercise oversight and
monitoring to ensure constitutional conditions of confinement in the areas of
prison overcrowding, 27 7 excessive force complaints27 1 medical 279 and mental
health care, 8 and parolee procedural due process rights.28 ' Although federal court
intervention may not have directly caused recent political attempts to reform the
CDCR bureaucracy, the publicity generated by federal court action and the
subsequent exposure of systemic abuses contributed to the steps taken by both
the California legislative and executive branches. 2 The state is finally actingalbeit ten years after serious federal judicial intervention began.
IV. CONCLUSION
The shift from modem penal systems, which focused on individual rehabilitation
and preparation for re-integration into general society, to a neo-classical mode in
which state power accumulates at the expense of the individual, has resulted in a
"reflexivity of the penal system." In this system, the power of prison industries and
corrections employees grows as prison populations increase.2 3 Increased power is
further reinforced by heightened prosecutions for what were previously minor
offenses and by the tendency of parole and probation officers to return parolees to
prison for technical violations."
at B3 (since writing this article the department is now the "California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation" (CDCR)).
274. Id.
275. Arax & Warren, supra note 152.
276. Jenifer Warren, State to Scrap Key ParoleReform, L.A. TIMEm, Apr. 9, 2005, at Al.
277. Jenifer Warren & Tim Reiterman, Crowding at State Prisons Has State in a Jam, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2005, at Al.
278. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
279. Plata v. Davis, No. C-01-1351 TEH (stipulation for injunctive relief E.D. Cal. 2002); Gates v.
Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1993).
280. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
281. Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
282. See discussion supra, Section I.A.
283. Caplow & Simon, supra note 66, at 72-73.
284. LHC PAROLE REPORT, supra note 175 (outlining California's administrative parole revocation
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Although lawyers and public interest law groups have undertaken structural
prison reform litigation since the 1960s, there has been a resurgence of claims of
prisoner abuse over the last decade because systematic use of excessive force,
punishment, and retaliation by prison guards has escalated.285 If prisons map the
"social body," this diachronic trend away from rehabilitation and back toward
physical discipline and punishment threatens the legal and social order.286 Increased
to increased government control
government control and abuse of prisoners leads
7
and abuse of individuals outside prison walls.1
Torture was classically condoned by the state as the regulated production of
pain in a ritualized setting.2 8 At Pelican Bay, however, physical violence by guards
was prevalent and systematic and used by prison guards and administrators to
establish their power, rather than perform a legitimate penological purpose.28 9 Judge
Henderson sought to bring the prison, and eventually the CDCR, back into line
with accepted penal practices and the scope of the Eighth Amendment's evolving
standards of civilized society.
The prisoner-guard conflict at Pelican Bay mirrors the ongoing tension
between state power and individual rights while illustrating the problem of
excessive power in closed institutions: "[T]ere must be a principle of moderation
for the power of punishment" lest unrestrained state power filter into the rest of
the social order.29 Legal texts and judicial intervention, rather than the political
process, may be the only effective ways to mediate the power of prison officials
with the rights of prisoners, especially when felons are shut out of the political
process through disfranchisement and political pragmatism; it is the rare elected
official who can take up the mantle of prison reform without judicial prodding.2
In the words of Justice William Brennan:
M

Those who we would banish from society or from human community
itself often speak in too faint a voice to be heard above society's demand
for punishment. It is the particular role of courts to hear these voices, for

process).
285. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (describing the ordeal of an inmate handcuffed to a
post for hours at a time); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (alleging a constitutional violation when
guards forced a transsexual inmate to live in the general population); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)
(holding that the use of excessive force violates the Eighth Amendment regardless of whether the inmate suffers
serious harm); see supranotes 2-8 and accompanying text.
286. FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 78.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 33, 39 (characterizing the goal of torture as crime deterrence or confession).
289. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
290. FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 90.
291. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 23, at 66-79 (noting that Arkansas officials were caught in a cycle of
prison scandals and turned the comer only after federal judicial intervention gave them an excuse to act). Of
course, in other states, elected officials were reluctant to undertake any reform and deeply resented judicial
intervention. Id. at 80-85 (describing the history of Texas' experience with prison reform).
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the Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone
dictate the conditions of social life.292
Federal judges, in the context of structural prison reform litigation, have
compelled remedies of constitutional deficiencies and the enforcement of individual
constitutional rights when the political process has failed. 293 The recent California
experience shows that intervention in state institutions by federal courts is justified to
protect the Constitutional rights of those shut out of the political process.294 Prisoners
are one such class, many of whom, if given a chance, could become a full part of
society.
Without the publicity generated by the Pelican Bay Prison case, it is likely
that constitutional violations of prisoner civil rights by California prison guards
and administrators would have continued unabated.2 95 Judge Henderson's actions,
culminating in a threatened takeover of California's prisons, have resulted in
some steps toward reform by California's legislative and executive branches.296
Still, whether such reforms will be implemented remains to be seen.
The Pelican Bay case illustrates the ambivalence about federal judicial
power.297 The tension between the tenets of democratic elections and the dictates
of the Constitution is exemplified by Judge Henderson's actions. Continued
critiques of activist federal judges may lead to fewer judges willing to endure
such criticism and take the steps required to remedy violations of our individual
constitutional rights. Judicial independence continues to be threatenedCalifornia's prisons demonstrate why such independence is necessary.

292. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,343 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
293. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (placing the entire state prison
system into receivership after eight years of willful intransigence by an uncooperative defendant); Pugh v.
Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (extending the holding to all conditions within prisons and finding
the conditions of confinement within the prisons violated "any judicial definition of cruel and unusual
punishment"); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (holding the lack of medical care to be
a willful and intentional violation of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
294. See discussion supra Part .C.
295. See discussion supra Part Ifl.A.
296. See discussion supra Parts III.C-II.D.
297. See discussion supra Parts I-Il.
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